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The remote area employment cases show clear recognition by the
courts that a certain amount of recreation is not only desirable but neces-
sary for the proper discharge of employment services. When an em-
ployer has chosen to annex recreation activities to the employment either
by affirmative action through financial assistance or active encour-
agement, or by acquiescing in their continued practice, resulting in-
juries should be compensable under workmen's compensation acts.
Furthermore, the rapid and continuing growth of company recreation
programs forcefully demonstrates that industry itself recognizes recrea-
tion activities as an important facet of business and an incident of
employment.
THE INDIANA GUEST STATUTE
In recent years automobile tort law has been affected by the enact-
ment and impact of the so-called guest statutes. These statutes define the
duty owed by the owner or operator of an automobile to one in the
vehicle whose legal status is that of a guest. A guest who is injured in
an automobile mishap in a state which has not adopted such a statute
may proceed against his host within the framework of a common law
negligence action.' However, a guest who is injured in one of the
twenty-seven states which have enacted guest statutes2 must allege and
prove much more than ordinary negligence in order to recover for his
personal bodily injuries.8
Despite a divergent variety of standards expressed in the guest stat-
utes of the different states,4 there is more harmony than disparity among
the state courts as to both the method of approach and the ultimate re-
sults under such statutes.5 The Indiana guest statute and the interpreta-
tion it receives by the Indiana courts are typical of the statutes and court
jured while conferring with fellow employee about bowling league organized by em-
ployer).
1. 4 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE pt. 1 § 2311
(pern. ed. 1946).
2. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington and Wyoming.
3. 4 BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2313.
4. The standards of conduct required for liability are variously described as inten-
tional, willful, wanton, grossly negligent, reckless, and heedless.
5. See PRoSsER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 77, at 452 (2d ed. 1955); Note, 35 MIcH. L.
REv. 804 (1937).
NOTES
decisions in other jurisdictions.' Under the present Indiana statute the
owner or operator of a motor vehicle is not liable for the ". . . injuries
to or death of a guest, while being transported without payment there-
for .. .unless such injuries or death are caused by the wanton or wilful
misconduct of such operator or owner .... "7 The purpose of this note
is to inspect the doctrines developed by those cases involving the guest
statute that have been decided by the Indiana courts.
Prior to adoption of the first Indiana guest statute in 1929,8 the
duties an automobile owner or operator owed to a guest riding in his
vehicle in this state were delineated by the doctrines of common law neg-
ligence.' Contrary to the approach utilized in some other jurisdictions
also without guest statutes, the Indiana courts did not analyze the duties
an automobile owner or operator owes to his guest by drawing upon the
analogous doctrines which determine the tort duties an occupier of real
estate owes toward a person on his property through a classification of
the latter's status as a trespasser, licensee or an invitee."0 Indiana, as
well as most other states, adheres to the traditional common law position
that there are no variations of nor degrees in negligence."' Thus, prior
to adoption of the guest statute, it was impossible for the Indiana courts
to assess the liability of an automobile host to his guest by imposing such
liability only when his conduct could be categorized as "grossly negli-
gent." A few states that have not enacted guest statutes, but that recog-
nize various degrees of negligence, have arrived at practically the same
results in their case law as have other states under the guest statutes. 2
A number of reasons have been suggested for legislatures having
adopted the guest statutes. Blashfield, in his noted treatise on Automo-
bile Law, says of such statutes that, "They were designed to relieve the
harshness of the common-law rule which requires the exercise of ordi-
6. Compare Brown v. Saucerman, 145 N.E.2d 898 (Ind. 1957), with Fink v. Dasier,
273 Mich. 416, 263 N.W. 412 (1935).
7. Im. ANN. STAT. § 47-1021 (Bums 1952).
8. IN-D. REv. STAT. c. 201, § 1 (1929).
9. Munson v. Rupker, 96 Ind. App. 15, 148 N.E. 169 (1925).
10. "A trespasser and licensee going upon a tract of land-an inert, immovable
body-takes it as he finds it, with knowledge that the owner cannot and will not by any
act of his start it in motion and hurl it through space in a manner that may mean death
to him who enters thereon. He who enters an automobile to take a ride with the owner
also takes the automobile and the driver as he finds them. But, when the owner of the
automobile starts it in motion, he, as it were, takes the life of his guest into his keep-
ing. . . . The law exacts of one who puts a force in motion that he shall control it with
skill and care in proportion to the danger created. This rule applies to a guest at suf-
ferance as well as to a guest by invitation." Id. at 30, 148 N.E. at 173-74.
11. Union Traction Co. v. Berry, 188 Ind. 514, 121 N.E. 655 (1919) ; PRossaa, THE
LAW oF ToRTS § 33, at 149 (2d ed. 1955).
12. See, e.g., Flynn v. Hurley, 332 Mass. 182, 124 N.E2d 810 (1955).
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nary care even to a recipient of the driver's kindness and hospitality."'"
A more pragmatic explanation is that many such suits are of a collusive
"friendly nature" which would not be litigated but for the fact that the
defendant's insurance coverage would prevent his personal assets from
being subjected to satisfaction of a judgment. Since most automobile
guests are either social friends, relatives or immediate members of the
driver's family, the possibility of collusive, fraudulent negligence suits
when the driver is insured becomes strikingly apparent.14
The "wanton or wilful" standard of conduct prescribed by the Indi-
ana guest statute is applicable only if the vehicle occupant can be cate-
gorized under the technical legal status of a guest.15 If he can not be so
classified, it is settled that he may proceed against the host-driver in an
ordinary negligence action." Thus, when one is confronted with an
automobile tort and the injured party was an occupant of the potential
defendant's vehicle, the first line of inquiry should be directed toward
determining whether the injured party was a guest within the meaning
of the statute. This is not always a simple task.
It has been held that both an invitation on the part of the owner and
an acceptance of the invitation on the part of the guest are necessary to
establish the host-guest relationship.' Thus, one who is mentally in-
capable of accepting an invitation could not be a guest.1" However, one's
voluntary presence in an automobile purely for social purposes places him
in the status of a guest within the meaning of the statute in that he was
"being transported without payment therefor."1
Most of the cases in this state that have construed the word "guest"
as it is used in the statute arose from situations where it was alleged that
there was either a business relationship of some nature between the
parties or an express or implied contract as to payment of the expenses of
the trip. If the host has received some kind of material benefit or com-
13. 4 BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2292, at 305.
14. See generally Hodges, The Automobile Guest Statutes, 12 TEXAs L. Ray. 303
(1934).
15. See Long v. Archer, 221 Ind. 186, 46 N.E.2d 818 (1943).
16. Long v. Archer, 221 Ind. 186, 46 N.E.2d 818 (1943) ; Lawson v. Cole, 124 Ind.
App. 89, 115 N.E.2d 134 (1953) ; Ott v. Perrin, 116 Ind. App. 315, 63 N.E.2d 163 (1945);
Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941).
17. Fuller v. Thrun, supra note 16.
18. Because of her infancy, a child seven years of age was found to be incapable of
entering into the consensual status of an automobile guest. Ibid. Arguably, the lack of
a consensual agreement would also exclude from the statute one forced against his will
to ride in an automobile.
19. Thus, plaintiff was a guest when he was injured while returning with the de-
fendant-driver from a trip which had as its sole purpose the playing of a game of roque.
Swinney v. Roler, 113 Ind. App. 367, 47 N.E.2d 846 (1943). Accord, Frymier v. Butler,
110 Ind. App. 531, 39 N.E.2d 809 (1942).
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pensation from the injured occupant of his vehicle, the occupant escapes
the operation of the statute. Such a relationship or contract precludes
the guest status because the automobile occupant was not "transported
without payment therefor."
The first Indiana decision to explore fully the meaning of guest as
it is used in the statute was Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stitle,20 decided
in 1942. In this case, the plaintiff's insured was an interior decorator
employed by a furniture store which was doing business with defendant.
It was necessary for the employee and defendant to travel to Chicago in
order to select furniture which was then to have been sold to defendant
by the furniture store. They drove in defendant's car and the employee
was injured on the trip. The latter claimed workmen's compensation,
which the plaintiff-insurance company paid. It in turn sued the defend-
ant for her negligence. In holding that the injured employee's presence
in the automobile arose from a situation which gave sufficient compen-
sation to the defendant so the jury could reasonably find that the former
was out of the guest statute, the Supreme Court formulated the frame-
work within which all subsequent evalutions of the host-guest relationship
have been made.
If the trip is primarily social, incidental benefits though mone-
tary do not exclude the guest relationship. If the trip is pri-
marily for business purposes and the one to be charged receives
substantial benefit, though not payment in a strict sense, the
guest relationship does not exist. Expectation of a material
gain rather than social companionship must have motivated the
owner or operator in inviting or permitting the other person to
ride. . . . Of primary importance are the motives actuating
the parties. 21
The court considered two factors to be important in determining whether
an automobile occupant was "transported without payment" so as to be
a guest within the language of the statute. First, the motive and pur-
pose of the driver in inviting the guest must have been directed toward
an expectation of a benefit from the relationship. Second, the benefit
accruing to the driver must have been substantial and material rather
than incidental.
These factors were next utilized by the Appellate Court in the ostens-
ibly analogous case of Albert McGann Securities Co. v. Coen,22 in which
20. 220 Ind. 180, 41 N.E.2d 133 (1942).
21. Id. at 185-86, 41 N.E.2d at 135-36.
22. 114 Ind. App. 60, 48 N.E.2d 58 (1943).
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plaintiff unsuccessfully asserted that the business relationship existing
between him and defendant was such as to give sufficient compensation
to the latter in order to take the case out of the guest statute. Defendant
was in the business of buying and selling securities. Plaintiff handled
investments and securities for his bank. The parties were making the
trip for the purpose of attending a banker's convention. The success of
defendant's business depended upon the formation, cultivation and
strengthening of friendly relations with customers and prospective cus-
tomers. This was done in anticipation of new and additional business
transactions and consequent pecuniary profit. Utilizing the concepts
established in the Liberty case, the court concluded that plaintiff was a
guest within the meaning of the statute in that defendant had not received
payment for the transportation.
It would appear that the essential factor which prevented plaintiff
from escaping the operation of the guest statute was his failure to show
the expectation of a sufficiently substantial material benefit which de-
fendant was to realize from inviting plaintiff to ride with him. The
benefit which defendant anticipated from the relationship was certainly
not capable of precise determination, nor was it certain. His invitation
to the plaintiff was not motivated by a desire to consummate a planned
business transaction; he only desired to cultivate more closely the plain-
tiff's friendship and make him more amenable and likely to do business
with his company in the future.2"
In the Liberty case, the substantiality and certainty of the defend-
ant's benefit were more apparent. There, defendant expected to be able
to decorate and furnish her home adequately as a result of plaintiff's
assistance at the furniture wholesale houses. In both cases the motives
of the defendants were similar; they anticipated gaining definite ad-
vantages from having the plaintiffs in their automobiles. However, in
the Coen case where the guest status was found to exist, the advantages
accruing to the host were conditioned entirely upon the uncertainties of
future development.
Since the material substantiality and certainty of the payment which
accrues to the defendant-driver is the determining factor under the guest
statute in establishing or denying the host-guest relationship, it is diffi-
cult to formulate precise standards against which any set of facts can be
measured. The most that can be said is that the more indications plain-
23. This analysis was utilized to find the host-guest relationship in United States v.
Alexander, 234 F.2d 861, 867 (4th Cir. 1956). The means of transportation in this case
was an airplane rather than an automobile. Airplane guests are subject to a guest statute
substantially identical to the automobile statute. See Ixn. AxN. STAT. § 14-924 (Burns
1952).
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tiff can muster which point toward the defendant's having intended to
derive a non-incidental, certain and substantial material benefit from the
relationship, the more likely it is that he will be able' to exclude himself
from the operation of the guest statute.
When the parties have made an express contractual arrangement for
the payment of expenses on a trip, the automobile occupant is not a guest
and may proceed against his host with a common law negligence action:
Thus, when defendant agreed to drive and plaintiff was to pay for the.
gas, oil and food, the court held that the jury properly could have found"
that the relationship between, the parties was business rather than social.2
Several cases have arisei from situations, in which the 'parties had
informal arrangements either to drive each other to work on alternating
days or for one to drive and the other to pay. for the gas and oil con-
sumed. When plaintiff's decedent had driven to and from work' with
defendant for several months prior to the fatal accident and had been
regularly paying the gasoline expenses, it was held that he was not a
guest under the statute even though he had not paid for gasoline on the
day of the accident. 5 However, if there was no definite arrangement
between them for the payment of expenses, the occupant is a guest even
though he had been riding with defendant for a long period of time and
had occasionally purchased gasoline for the automobile."
The crucial element here is a contract or arrangement between the
parties whereby the occupant of the vehicle has agreed to reimburse the
driver in some manner for the expenses of his transportation. But the
relationship must be such as to indicate more of a business arrangement
than a friendly, generous offer by the guest to share the expenses."
24. Lawson v. Cole, 124 Ind. App. 89, 115 N.E.2d 134 (1953). The court stressed
the considerations which prompted the defendant to allow plaintiff to ride in his car.
"We must determine in the instant case whether the evidence leads inescapably to the
conclusion that social companionship rather than material gain motivated the appellant
in inviting or permitting the appellee to ride with him ... " Id. at 95-96, 115 N.E.2d
at 138.
25. Kempin v. Mardis, 123 Ind. App. 546, 111 N.E.2d 77 (1953). Similarly, plain-
tiff is not a guest when the parties had taken turns driving one another to work. Ott
v. Perrin, 116 Ind. App. 315, 63 N.E.2d 163 (1945).
26. Lee Brothers v. Jones, 114 Ind. App. 688, 54 N.E.2d 108 (1944). Here, de-
fendant did not expect decedent to pay anything or contribute any gasoline.
27. One must determine the basic purpose of the automobile trip. If this purpose is
more social than business, the fact that the guest has volunteered or agreed to share the
expenses will not in itself change this purpose and take the guest out of the statute. Thus,
in Albert McGann Securities Co. v. Coen, 114 Ind. App. 60, 48 N.E.2d 58 (1943), even
plaintiff's payment of a portion of the gasoline expenses in addition to other elements
indicating a business purpose were not sufficient to eliminate the guest status. Isolated
and unsolicited purchases of gasoline or contributions toward the costs of a trip are not
sufficient payment to preclude the guest status. Lee Brothers v. Jones, supra note 26.
Cf. Allison v. Ely, 153 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. 1958).
343.
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The definition of guest as it is used in the statute has arisen in one
other context in Indiana. If plaintiff is an employee of defendant-
driver and at the time of the accident is acting in the course of his
employment, he is not a guest within the meaning of the statute.2"
Once it has been determined that an automobile occupant is a guest,
one must next consider whether the defendant's conduct was such that
there may be recovery under the statute. It should be noted at the outset
that the present guest statute is not the only one that has been in existence
in this state. The first guest statute was enacted in 1929. Under the
terms of that act an automobile operator was not liable to his guest unless
". .. such accident shall have been intentional on the part of such owner
or operator or caused by his reckless disregard of the rights of others."29
In 1937, the present statute replaced the former. The language of this
statute requires that the injuries be ". . . caused by the wanton or wilful
misconduct . . .. " of the vehicle owner or operator."0 Construction of
the dissimilar language could have resulted in different standards of
conduct for liability under the two statutes. However, this did not hap-
pen. There is no appreciable difference in the factors which have been
considered important in assessing liability of an automobile host under
the two acts. The courts that have applied the 1937 act have utilized
the same descriptive words and phrases that had been used under the 1929
act to determine a host's liability to his guest.3 Thus, there is no de-
terminable difference in the results of similar cases under the two acts.32
For the foregoing reasons, the cases which have determined the standard
of care under the two statutes will be considered without differentiation
as to which statute was applicable.
The conduct set forth in the statute which gives rise to liability is
28. Long v. Archer, 221 Ind. 186, 46 N.E.2d 818 (1943). Similarly, inmates of a
state institution would not be guests while being transported under authority of the in-
stitution. See 1939 OPs. IND. A~r'Y GEN. 41.
29. IND. REv. STxAT. c. 201, § 1 (1929).
30. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1021 (Burns 1952).
31. . The case of Bedwell v. DeBolt, 47 N.E.2d 176 (Ind. App. 1943), rev'd onother
grounds, 221 Ind. 600, 50 N.E.2d 875 (1943), was the first to utilize the 1937 act for a
determination of conduct sufficient for liability. The Appellate Court recognized that
it would have to determine "whether the phrase 'wanton or wilful misconduct' is essen-
tially different from 'an act intentional or caused by reckless disregard of the rights of
others." Id. at 181. This question was only indirectly answered in the case. The
court noted that under the original act the guest had to prove "more than negligence"
in order to establish liability and said about the 1937 Act that, "in view of the manifest
purpose of the Act, it is clearly apparent that something more than 'negligence' was
ascribed to the meaning of the word 'wanton' as used in the amendatory Act of 1937."
Ibid. The court did not more definitively ascertain whether the legislature had intended
to change the conduct required for liability under the guest statute.
32. Compare Hettmansperger v. Hettmansperger, 103 Ind. App. 632, 5 N.E.2d 685
(1937), with Bybee, v. Brooks, 123 Ind. App. 129, 106 N.E.2d 693 (1952).
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"wanton or wilful misconduct."33 [Emphasis added] These two adjec-
tives are used in the alternative or disjunctive rather than in the conjunc-
tive. 8 Thus, the defendant would be liable to his guest either for "wan-
ton misconduct" or for "wilful misconduct." Under the common law,
prior to enactment of the guest statute, there had been a dissimilarity in
the meanings which the judiciary ascribed to "wilful" and "wanton." 5
However, in applying the guest statute the courts have not acknowledged
that there is any essential difference in the meanings of these two
words.3" In holding the vehicle owner or operator liable to his guest they
always declare that he was guilty of "wanton or wilful misconduct" with-
out indicating which of the two concepts was given dominant considera-
tion.r
If the words were to be used conjunctively, the guest would always
have to allege and prove that defendant's conduct was "wilful" in addi-
tion to "wanton" in order to establish liability.8 Such an interpretation
would result in a paucity of recoveries under the guest statute in that a
fact situation will seldom arise in which the defendant's conduct could be
characterized as "wilful.""9  The cases have not imposed this stringent
33. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1021 (Burns 1952).
34. There has been no specific holding that the words were intended to be used dis-
junctively. However, use of the disjunctive "or" supports such a conclusion. In no case
has there been the slightest suggestion that the conjunctive use was intended. Further-
more, the discussion in several cases appears to be predicated upon the underlying as-
sumption that the words are used disjunctively. See, e.g., Rickner v. Haller, 124 Ind.
App. 369, 380, 116 N.E.2d 525, 530 (1954); Bedwell v. De Bolt, 47 N.E.2d 176,
181 (Ind. App. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 221 Ind. 600, 50 N.E.2d 875 (1943).
35. When plaintiff alleged that defendant had "wilfully" injured him, his burden
of proof was close to that required to establish an intentional tort. In such a case the
plaintiff had to show that the act was intentionally committed or that there was a design
or purpose to inflict the injury. See, e.g., Vandalia R. Co. v. Clem, 49 Ind. App. 94, 96
N.E. 789 (1911). Allegation of "wanton" conduct placed somewhat less of a burden of
proof upon the plaintiff. The defendant need not have intended to commit the act nor
to have caused the injury, but he must have been guilty of more than negligence because
the plaintiff's contributory negligence was not an adequate defense. In order to estab-
lish that defendant's conduct was "wanton," plaintiff had to show that defendant was
conscious that the natural and probable consequence of his action would be to injure
another. BERRY, THE LAW OF AUToMoBILES § 1231 (7th ed. 1935). The meanings of
"wilful" and "wanton" lost what significance they had held when it was finally settled
that there were no degrees of negligence in Indiana. See Union Traction Co. v. Berry,
188 Ind. 514, 121 N.E. 655 (1919).
36. See, e.g., Kahan v. Wecksler, 104 Ind. App. 673, 12 N.E.2d 998 (1938).
37. All of the Indiana cases decided under the 1937 Act bear this out.
38. Under the definitions of "wilful" and "wanton" in note 35 stqpra, "wilful" con-
duct involves more culpability and fauillt than is the case with "wanton" conduct. Thus,
if one's conduct were such that it could be classified as "wilful," it would necessarily
meet the less stringent requirements of "wanton" conduct. The converse however,
would not be true.
39. In only one of the more than forty reported cases involving the guest statute
has the defendant's conduct been such that it would come close to meeting the require-
ments for "wilful misconduct" as it has been defined herein. See Trent v. Rodgers, 123
Ind. App. 139, 104 N.E.2d 759 (1952). There is an excellent factual explanation for the
paucity of such fact situations. Before the defendant-driver's conduct can be charac-
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burden upon the'plaintiff."4 Since "wanton or wilful" modifies "mis-
condhct" disjunctively, the plaintiff needs to prove only that defendant's
conduct Was "Wianton" eqen if it' as in, fact "wilful." Thus, for all prac-
tical purposes, the word "wilful'f is -of snall 'consequence in Applying the
guest statute.
The cases under the guest statute have' emphasized two factors
which the injured guest'must prove before the ownfer" or opeiator of an
automobile can be held liable fo' 'wantonor wilful' misconduct." First,
defendant; must have had knowledge of the iinpending danger. Second,
defendant's action must have exhibited" his indifference 'to. the conse-
quences of his !onduct. This last phase of the test'represents the core
of "wanton or wilful misconduct"; its existence is established by proof
of th preceding condition and defendant's, subsequent, cdnduct:
Tliu-s I : is' first necessary to: deteimine whether defendant had
kn ledge o' Was-aware of the danger to the safety of his guest; he must
have- pdceiV6d'the hazardous environmental concditions with which he
was confronted and he must have. been conscious that a high probability
of danger existed. It may be shown that his knowledge of the hazardous
conditions was obtained either through his own perception4' or from
others. 2 Certainly the plaintiff is in a much better position to prove
this if one of the occupants of the vehicle had called his attention to the
hazardous circumstances. In ascertaining whether defendant was aware
of the situation confronting him, the standard so sacred to negligence
actions, the reasonably prudent man, is discarded to the extent that the
required knowledge must have been real rather than that which should
have been known by a reasonable man in similar circumstances.
That the defendant's knowledge must be actual is illustrated by the
case of Hoesel v. Cain," in which the defendant was driving at night on
a road with which he was familiar. The road was straight and level,
terized as "wilful" it must be found that he intentionally performed the dangerously
injurious act or that he had a design to cause the injury. The driver of a vehicle is
enclosed within the machine just as is his guest and he is scarcely better protected from
the consequences of a wreck than his guest. In view of these circumstances, few drivers
would intentionally embark upon a course of conduct designed to harm the guest when
the possibility of injury is as great for the driver as it is for the guest.
40. In Blair v. May, 106 Ind. App. 599, 19 N.E.2d 490 (1939), the court upheld the
trial court's refusal to give an instruction tendered by the defendant which ". . . em-
bodied the idea that no recovery could be had if 'there was no purpose or design on the
part of the defendant to inflict the injuries complained of ..
41. See Miller v. Smith, 125 Ind. App. 293, 124 N.E.2d 874 (1955); Rickner v.
Haller, 124 Ind. App. 369, 116 N.E.2d 525 (1954).
42. See Bybee v. Brooks, 123 Ind. App. 129, 106 N.E.2d 693 (1952); Hettman-
sperger v. Hettmansperger, 103 Ind. App. 632, 5 N.E.2d 685 (1937).
43. 222 Ind. 330, 53 N.E.2d 165 (1944). Accord, Brown v. Saucerman, 145 N.E.2d
898 (Ind. 1957) ; Becker v. Strater, 117 Ind. App. 504, 72 N.E.2d 580 (1947).
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but there was a slight dip which obscured oncoming cars. Defendant
drove onto the left lane in order to pass a car; he saw the lights of a car
coming toward him out of the dip and attempted to get back into his own
lane, but was unable to do so and collided with the other automobile. He
was exonerated from liability to the injured guest because it was not
shown that he had knowledge of the approach of the other car before he
crossed the center line of the road.44
After it is established that defendant had perceived the external con-
ditions which posed the threat to safety, it must be shown from his own
voluntary conduct and its relation to the hazard that he was conscious
that a high probability of danger existed.4" It may be shown that de-
fendant was conscious of the danger when one or more of the guests had
remonstrated and called the situation to his attention. Several cases of
this character have arisen in Indiana.4" In such a situation if the danger
was more real than imaginary and if the driver paid no heed to the warn-
ings, his consciousness may be proved easily. Without proof of such
warnings it is more difficult to show that defendant was conscious of the
danger. In practice the trier of fact is called upon to decide whether the
defendant, knowing of the hazardous conditions confronting him, should
have inferred the existence of danger.4"
The final element which plaintiff must prove in order to establish
liability for "wanton or wilful misconduct" is that the defendant ex-
hibited an indifference toward the consequences of his conduct. This
is the one factor which more than anything else differentiates an action
under the guest statute from a common law negligence action. In order
to gain recovery of damages under a negligence theory, plaintiff must
prove that defendant's conduct was below that which would have been
pursued by an ordinary man in similar circumstances. However, to make
out a case of "wanton or wilful misconduct" under the guest statute, it
has to be shown that defendant's conduct was such as to indicate that he
was not concerned whether he was about to injure another person. This
44. In most cases the proof required to establish defendant's knowledge has been
more direct than inferential. However, there have been a few cases in which knowledge
was shown without any direct proof ; knowledge of the surrounding circumstances was
proved only by circumstantial evidence. This has been particularly true when defendant
was involved in a situation in which it would have been next to impossible for him to be
unaware of the hazards confronting him. See, e.g., Eikenberry v. Neher, 126 Ind. App.
571, 134 N.E.2d 710 (1956) ; Miller v. Smith, 125 Ind. App. 293, 124 N.E.2d 874 (1955).
45. Consciousness of danger was stressed heavily in the recent case of Brown v.
Saucerman, 145 N.E.2d 898 (Ind. 1957).
46. Loehr v. Meuser, 120 Ind. App. 630, 93 N.E.2d 363 (1950) ; Ridgway v. Yenny,
223 Ind. 16, 57 N.E.2d 581 (1944); Jay v. Holman, 106 Ind. App. 413, 20 N.E.2d 656
(1939).
47. Miller v. Smith, 25 Ind. App. 293, 124 N.E.2d 874 (1955).
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point is aptly illustrated by the case of Trent v. Rodgers.48 Defendant
had taken plaintiff out for a social evening; they had an altercation and
plaintiff wanted to be taken home. Defendant suddenly turned into an
alley, rapidly backed out into the street and hit another car. He later
admitted that he had seen the lights of the car, but that he was so "damned
mad" he did not care whether he hit it or not.
Conduct based upon an honest mistake of judgment is not sufficient
to show that defendant was indifferent to the consequences of such con-
duct. Thus, there was no liability when, as defendant neared a cross-
road, his guest warned him of a car approaching on an intersecting road.
Defendant looked at the car, observed its movement, concluded that it
was stopping, and proceeded on his course at a high rate of speed without
paying further attention to it. Defendant's belief that he would success-
fully avoid the other automobile negated the allegation that his mental
attitude was one of indifference to the consequences of his conduct."'
Similarly, it is not shown that defendant was unconcerned over whether
he was about to injure another person when the accident resulted from
inadvertance8 falling asleep5 or failing to anticipate the conduct of an-
other driver.52
An important consideration in determining defendant's indifference
to the consequences of his conduct is whether the injury resulted from a
persistent or continuing course of misconduct. This, in itself, is not an
entirely adequate guide, as a momentary act may be wanton, whereas a
continuing course of misconduct may not be. Nevertheless, a momentary
act usually does not reveal an indifference to consequences, whereas a
continuing course of misconduct is more likely to indicate such indiffer-
ence. The cases bear out this proposition. Thus, when defendant vio-
lated a statute governing conduct on the road,5" when he acted in an
emergency or acted thoughtlessly,55 it has been held that his conduct
was not such as manifested an indifference to the consequences. On the
48. 123 Ind. App. 139, 104 N.E.2d 759 (1952).
49. Swinney v. Roler, 113 Ind. App. 367, 47 N.E.2d 846 (1943).
50. Becker v. Strater, 117 Ind. App. 504, 72 N.E.2d 580 (1947).
51. Coconower v. Stoddard, 96 Ind. App. 287, 182 N.E. 466 (1932).
52. Lee Brothers v. Jones, 114 Ind. App. 688, 54 N.E.2d 108 (1944) ; Albert Mc-
Gann Securities Co. v. Coen, 114 Ind. App. 60, 48 N.E.2d 58 (1943).
53. Brown v. Saucerman, 145 N.E.2d 898 (Ind. 1957) ; Becker v. Strater, 117 Ind.
App. 504, 72 N.E.2d 580 (1947). Although violation of a statute is not in itself suf-
ficient to uphold a finding of wanton or wilful misconduct, such violation may properly
be considered in conjunction with other conduct in order to assess defendant's liability.
See Rickner v. Haller, 124 Ind. App. 369, 116 N.E2d 525 (1954); Pierce v. Clemens,
113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N.E.2d 836 (1943) ; Kraning v. Taggart, 103 Ind. App. 62, 1 N.E.2d
689 (1936).
54. Sheets v. Stalcup, 105 Ind. App. 66, 13 N.E.2d 346 (1938).
55. Hoesel v. Cain, 222 Ind. 330, 53 N.E.2d 165 (1944).
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other hand, when the evidence shows that defendant during an extended
length of time prior to the mishap had committed a series of unlawful
or perilous acts"6 or had been engaged in the same dangerous behavior
which caused the injury for a period of time immediately before the
mishap," it will be sufficient to establish that he was indifferent to the
consequences of his conduct. When such a course of misconduct is
established, the conclusion of defendant's indifference to the consequences
of his conduct is not averted even when the defendant later relents and
attempts to extricate his vehicle and passengers from the situation."5
The emergency doctrine is utilized with cases arising under the guest
statute in the same manner as in the law of negligence."0 Thus, when it
has been found that defendant's conduct was "wanton or wilful" and
such conduct was responsible for placing the automobile and its pas-
sengers in a position of imminently serious peril, he will be liable to his
guest notwithstanding his subsequently skillful operation of the vehicle
in a manner calculated to be the most likely to avoid the peril.6"
When it has been established that the automobile owner or operator
is guilty of "wanton or wilful misconduct" one must determine, as the
final analytical step, whether one or more of several defenses may defeat
the guest's recovery.
Since recovery under the guest statute is allowed only upon a finding
of "wanton or wilful" misconduct, it is not defeated by the common law
defense of contributory negligence.6' However, the guest himself may
be guilty of "wanton or wilful misconduct" which contributed to his in-
juries. The proof of such defense will preclude the guest's recovery."
Thus, "wanton or wilful misconduct" on the part of the plaintiff is just
as efficient to offset a defendant's "wanton or wilful misconduct" as
contributory negligence is to offset ordinary negligence. The result is
56. Loehr v. Meuser, 120 Ind. App. 630, 93 N.E.2d 363 (1950) ; Ridgway v. Yenny,
223 Ind. 16, 57 N.E.2d 581 (1944) ; Pierce v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N.E.2d 836
(1943).
57. Eikenberry v. Neher, 126 Ind. App. 571, 134 N.E.2d 710 (1956); Bybee v.
Brooks, 123 Ind. App. 129, 106 N.E.2d 693 (1952).
58. See, e.g., Loehr v. Meuser, 120 Ind. App. 630, 93 N.E.2d 363 (1950).
59. See PROssmR, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 137-38 (2d ed. 1955).
60. Bybee v. Brooks, 123 Ind. App. 129, 106 N.E2d 693 (1952). See Armstrong
v. Binzer, 102 Ind. App. 497, 199 N.E. 863 (1936).
61. Conconower v. Stoddard, 96 Ind. App. 287, 182 N.E. 466 (1932) ; Hoeppner v.
Saltzgaber, 102 Ind. App. 458, 200 N.E. 458 (1936) (dictum). That this point appears
to be almost universally recognized is evidenced by the fact that it has been raised on ap-
peal in only two of the reported cases, notwithstanding that in over half of such cases
sufficient facts appear to establish contributory negligence.
62. Thus in Pierce v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N.E.2d 836 (1943), the trial
court was held to have been in error for its refusal to instruct the jury that the plain-
tiff's wanton or wilful misconduct would bar his recovery. Cf. Ridgeway v. Yenny, 223
Ind. 16, 57 N.E.2d 581 (1944).
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that one who was equally to blame with another for producing his injury
is prevented from shifting his loss to the other person.
. The defense that the guest assumed the risk, or, as it is generally
said in Indiana, "incurred" the risk,"3 is available to the host under the
guest statute.64 In order to incur the risk, one must know of the impend-
,ing danger and then he must voluntarily submit himself to such danger.
An automobile guest is not in a position where he can easily flee from
the hazards posed by his host's misconduct. In many situations an at-
tempt to "escape from the automobile would be as likely to injure the guest
as remaining in the vehicle and taking a chance that the driver could
avoid an accident.65 Additionally, the conditions which would confront
the guest once he leaves the automobile must be taken into consideration.
Frequently such conditions would subject the guest to danger perhaps
equal to or greater than that presented by remaining in the vehicle. Under
such circumstances it could hardly be asserted that the guest voluntarily
exposed himself to the danger by remaining in the vehicle.6" The de-
fenses of contributory wanton or wilful misconduct and assumption of
risk have not been litigated extensively under the guest statute. How-
ever, there are no legal obstacles to prevent these defenses from being
successfully utilized in the proper circumstances.
63. See, e.g., Pierce v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 75-76, 46 N.E2d 836, 840-41
(1943).
64. This defense has been raised in only three reported cases. Ridgway v. Yenny,
223 Ind. 16, 57 N.E.2d 581 (1944) ; Pierce v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N.E.2d 836
(1943) ; Johnson v. Pedicord, 105 Ind. App. 71, 10 N.E.2d 295 (1937). In none of these
cases were the facts sufficient to establish assumption of risk. However, the cases
acknowledged that it would be a valid defense under the proper circumstances.
65. In most cases the guest's ability to remove himself from the danger would de-
pend almost entirely upon the consent and cooperation of his host. Such cooperation is
rarely achieved. The situation is illustrated by the many cases where the guest has first
warned the driver and then has pleaded unsuccessfully with him to stop the vehicle so
that he could get out. See, e.g., Loehr v. Meuser, 120 Ind. App. 630, 93 N.E.2d 363
(1950).
66. See Ridgway v. Yenny, 223 Ind. 16, 57 N.E.2d 581 (1944).
